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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of mercenaries in armed conflicts and in civil wars is an
age-old phenomenon. However, it is only in recent years that the
international community has tried to curb this practice. International
interest in this problem was brought about by a number of factors,
the most prominent being the activities of mercenaries during the
Congolese and Angolan civil wars, and the trial of those mercenaries
who participated in the Angolan civil war at Luanda after the es-
tablishment of an independent Angolan government.
The development of an international legal framework to control
the use of mercenaries started in the 1960's. At that time, the United
Nations became concerned that the use of foreign mercenary forces
could prevent and hinder the exercise of the right to self-determination
of peoples under colonial domination. What developed at the inter-
national level was a recognition that mercenary activities were an
affront to the principles of sovereign equality, political independence
and territorial integrity of states.' In addition, it was recognized that
mercenary activities violated the fundamental rights of individuals,
* B.Sc.Soc., LL.B(Ottawa), B.C.L.(Oxford), J.S.D.(in prog., Boalt Hall).
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91, U.N. Doc. A/42/773 (1987); G.A. Res. 43/107, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 43d
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such as the right to life, physical integrity and security and the
enjoyment of property.'
After briefly examining the definition and historical context of
mercenarism, this article will describe and discuss the efforts that
have been made at the international level in order to tackle the
mercenary problem. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that
although the activity of mercenarism and the mercenaries themselves
are now under greater control than ever, the international community
must continue to denounce the practice and must strive to attain an
international consensus on how such activities can be controlled.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To understand the current debate concerning the use of mercenaries
and the reason why international law did not seek to put an earlier
end to the practice of mercenarism, it is essential to examine the role
mercenaries have played throughout history. Mercenarism is an an-
cient profession.' Fighting or enlisting for gain was a prominent
feature of the Teutonic tribesmen in the Roman armies, of the
medieval knights-errant, of 17th century English and Scottish Con-
tinental armies, and of the Swiss Papal guards.4
Mercenarism as a profession can be traced as far back as antiquity.'
As regards European history, mercenaries have been known to exist
" See generally the reports on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means
of impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, submitted by
Special Rapporteur E. B. Ballesteros at: U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/43/
735 (1987); U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/14 (1988); U.N.
ESCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/14 (1989); U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/11 (1990); U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1991/14 (1991).
3 See generally C.C. BAYLEY, MERCENARIES FOR THE CRIMEA: THE GERMAN, SWISS
AND ITALIAN LEGIONS IN BRmsHi SERVICE, 1854-56 (1977); MICHAEL MALLETT, MER-
CENARIES AND THEIR MASTERS: WARFARE IN RENAISSANCE ITALY (1974); G.T. GRIFF,
THE MERCENARIES OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD (1968); JOHN SCHLIGHT, MONARCHS
AND MERCENARIES: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KNIGHT SERVICE IN
NORMAN AND EARLY ANGEVIN ENGLAND (1968); RICHARD G. PRESTON ET AL., MEN
IN ARMS (rev. ed. 1964).
4 See George Schwarzenberger, Terrorists, Hijackers, Guerrileros and Merce-
naries, 24 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS., 279-80 (1971); ABDULGAWI A. YUSuF, Mercenaries
in the Law of Armed Conflicts, in THE NEW HuMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICTS 113 (Antonio Casse ed., 1979); C.M. Peter, Mercenaries and International
Humanitarian Law, 24 INDIAN J. OF INT'L L. 373, 375-78 (1984).
1 See E. DAVID, MERCENAIRES ET VOLONTAIRES INTERNATIONAUX EN DROIT DES
GENS 4 (Editions de l'Universit6 de Bruxelles 1978).
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from the beginning of the 12th and 13th centuries. 6 During that
period, private forces were widely used in Italy. Special contractors,
"condottieri," recruited mercenaries into their ranks and then hired
out these men to the various princes who were engaged in wars. 7
This practice of using hired troops to wage war spread throughout
Europe. Mercenaries were then used as the sole combatants of an
army or to assist the hirer's own army in war.' During the 12th
century, mercenaries were mostly used for colonial conquests and for
maintaining foreign domination in the colonized countries.9
With the rise of monarchy, the status of mercenaries was en-
hanced. 10 Rulers relied on mercenaries to maintain order within their
own kingdoms and to fight their wars. They were useful to the kings
because:
Since as a rule only the king could afford to hire mercenaries in
bulk they strengthened both King and nobles against the people with
whom they had no ties or sympathy. While much more expensive
than native troops, they left no troublesome widows and orphans;
and at the end of the campaign they could be sent away unlike a
country's own men coming home from the wars."
During the 15th and 16th centuries, mercenaries were indispensable
to kings and noblemen. Because their employment was accepted as
a practice among states, mercenaries possessed an international status
of legitimacy. 2 In the early stages of the 16th century, however, there
emerged a new form of mercenarism which was linked to the strength-
ening of the State and to the gradual extinction of private wars. In
that period, the practice was no longer that of an individual selling
his services to a foreign king, but rather that of a king renting out
some of his people to foreign sovereigns. 3
6 Leszek Sosnowski, The Position of Mercenaries Under International Law, 19
INDIAN J. OF INT'L L. 382 (1979).
7 David, supra note 5, at 9.
1 Sosnowski, supra note 6.
9Id.
10 Peter, supra note 4, at 376.
1 V. KrERMAN, "FoREIGN MERCENARIES AND ABSOLUTE MONARCHY," PAST AND
PRESENT 69 (1958).11 M.O. Tandon, Legal and Political Status of Mercenaries in History and in the
Contemporary World, (1978) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Dar-
es-Salaam), cited in Peter, supra note 4, at 376.
,1 DAViD, supra note 5, at 10.
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With the advent of the 18th century and the rise of nationalism
and the formation of the citizen soldier, mercenarism declined. 4
During this period armies and army personnel were recruited among
citizens of the State and were paid monthly wages. The standing
army, therefore, replaced mercenaries as a means of defending the
State." By the beginning of the 19th century, the popularity of
mercenaries continued to decline, but the practice of mercenarism
was by no means extinct. The growth of the standing armies and
the development of the law of neutrality, however, made it more
difficult to legally defend the use of mercenaries and the practice of
mercenarism.16
Despite the fact that mercenarism faced a certain decline during
the 19th century, the practice resurfaced in another form in the 20th
century. 7 After the Second World War and the recognition of the
right of peoples to self-determination, mercenaries were used to thwart
movements of national liberation.'8 As Peter explains:
The oppressed were organized in Liberation Movements which started
guerilla warfare against their oppressors. Though poorly equipped,
their determination and commitment led to unexpected success. To
combat the national liberation movements, the imperialists could no
longer come out in the open and expose themselves. This would
make them lose face. All they wanted was to "invisibly" control
these countries. It is in this context that the modem mercenary has
become an important tool of imperialism. Mercenarism as a form
of soldiering is used as a vehicle for fighting the liberation movements
and independent developing countries. 9
It is during this period that a change of attitude occurred in the
international community. Mercenaries were no longer accepted as an
integral part of armies; they were now regarded as criminals. As
Green argues: "the profession of arms as conducted by professionals
prepared to serve an alien master came to be regarded with such
obloquy that it seemed almost to have sunk to the level of the supreme
crime against mankind.'' 2 It is precisely at this juncture that the
14 James L. Taulbee, Myths, Mercenaries and Contemporary International Law,
15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 339 (1985).
IS DAVID, supra note 5, at 11.
16 See generally 2 OPPENHtM's INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
" J. Tercinet, Les Mercenaires et le Droit International, 1977 ANNuAmE FRANCAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 269 (1977).
11 Sosnowski, supra note 6.
19 Peter, supra note 4, at 377-78.
20 L. C. Green, The Status of Mercenaries in International Law, 9 MANITOBA
L.J. 201, 224 (1979).
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United Nations started condemning the use of mercenaries.
III. DEFInNG MERCENARIES AND MERCENARY ACTIVITIES
The first step in prohibiting mercenary activities and the use of
mercenaries is to have a clear and workable definition of who qualifies
as a mercenary. If one is to punish mercenaries and deprive individuals
of important legal rights, there must exist clear criteria by which it
is possible to identify who will be punished. Further, if States are
to be forced to control certain activities within their territory, there
must exist clearly defined parameters that set out what is prohibited
and what is permitted. Until recently, there did not exist a consensus
on the precise meaning of what constituted a mercenary for legal
purposes. It is not surprising, therefore, that arriving at an inter-
national legal definition of the term "mercenary" was the main task
of the international community once it decided to curb the use of
mercenaries.
The traditional view of mercenaries is that they are non-nationals
who fight for monetary gain rather than loyalty and who are usually
indifferent to the claims of legality or the interests of their native
country. 21 Burmester defines mercenaries as volunteers who, for mon-
etary reward, agree to fight for the armed forces of a foreign state
or an entity.2
A. OAU Convention
One of the first organizations which tried to arrive at a general
definition of mercenaries was the Organization of African Unity
("OAU"). 23 In 1967, definitions were examined by the Ad Hoc
Committee for Expulsion of Mercenaries and in 1971 by the OAU's
Council of Ministers' Committee of Legal Experts. The Committee
21 ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE MERCENARIES 23 (1969). See also Riley Martin, Mer-
cenaries and the Rule of Law, 17 REV. INT'L CoMMn. JURISTS 51, 53 (1977) (arguing
that "it is impossible satisfactorily to define a mercenary without reference to his
motivation.").
22 H.C. Burmester, "The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Con-
flicts", 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 37 (1978).
"3 Nowhere was the problem of the interference of mercenaries more prominent
than in Africa. As Martin remarked: "the mercenary represents to the African
everything he fights to defeat: namely, racism and colonialism. For the mercenary
is almost invariably white and his participation in African liberation struggles in-
evitably carries racialist overtones. Moreover, the mercenary is seen as the accomplice
of powerful colonial interests-those which stand most to gain from maintaining
the status quo." Martin, supra note 21, at 32.
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of Experts charged with drafting a convention on mercenaries pre-
sented a report to the OAU's Council of Ministers in 1972, 2 and
the OAU adopted the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism
in Africa at Libreville in 1977.23
Article 1 of the Convention defines "mercenary" in the following
manner:
Under the present Convention a 'mercenary' is classified as anyone
who, not a national of the state against which his actions are directed,
is employed, enrolls or links himself willingly to a person, group
or organization whose aim is:
(a) to overthrow by force or arms or by any other means the
government of that Member State of the Organization of African
Unity;
(b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity or normal
working of the institutions of the said State;
(c) to block by any means the activities of any liberation movement
recognized by the Organization of African Unity.
Therefore, under Article 1 a mercenary cannot be a national of the
State against which his actions are directed, and he must be willingly
employed with the purpose of either overthrowing by force the gov-
ernment of a member State of the OAU, or obstructing the activities
of a liberation movement. One should note that under Article 1 no
reference is made to the question of private gain or compensation
received for the carrying out of the activities.
B. Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949
The question of mercenaries was also examined by the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts which was held
in Geneva from 1974 to 1977. In 1976, the Nigerian delegation took
the initiative and introduced in the Working Group of Committee
III a proposal for an article defining mercenaries and their status,
which was to be inserted in Protocol I on International Armed
Conflicts. 26 However, no consensus could be reached in 1976 on a
14 OAU Doc. CM/l/33/Ref. 1 (1972).
2 OAU Doc. CM/433/Rev.L, Annex I (1972) [hereinafter OAU Convention].
This Convention entered into force in 1985.
The Nigerian proposal defined mercenaries in the following manner:
2. A mercenary includes any person not a member of the armed forces of
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definition of "mercenary. ' 27 The reason for this stalemate was a
divergence of approaches between the Third World countries who
wanted a wide, all-encompassing definition (since they are the ones
who must endure the activities of mercenaries) and Western states
who were pushing for a narrow definition (because they are the main
suppliers of mercenaries). 28
However, further debate in 1977 on the question of a definition
led to the adoption of Article 47 in Protocol I. According to paragraph
2 of Article 47, a mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a
Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess
of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and func-
tions in the armed forces of that party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
and
a party to the conflict who is specially recruited abroad and who is motivated
to fight or to take part in armed conflict essentially for monetary payment,
reward or other private gain.
III Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and De-
velopment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 3d
Sess., Doc. CDDH/III/GT/82 at 192 (1976).
For more information on Protocol I, see infra notes 175-189 and accompanying
text.
27 For a general discussion of the 1976 deliberations, see H.W. Van Deventer,
Mercenaries at Geneva, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 811 (1976). Taulbee notes that the issues
discussed during the 1976-77 debates centered around:
(1) whether a distinction should be drawn between non-resident non-na-
tionals and resident nationals;
(2) whether a 'mercenary' includes all who meet certain operative tests, or
whether some overt actions directly related to hostilities are necessary;
(3) whether outside private forces and national troops should be considered
different from third party States;
(4) whether individuals recruited for a specific conflict should be distin-
guished from those recruited under other circumstances;
(5) whether motive should be defined through objective tests; and
(6) whether a legal distinction should be drawn between "legitimate" and
"non-legitimate" movements for national liberation.
Taulbee, supra note 14, at 351.
2 R.C. HiNOOR.AN, PRISONERS Or WAR, 62 (1982).
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(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of the armed forces.
As can be seen from this article, the segments of the definition used
to identify mercenaries are cumulative. This means that no one re-
quirement found in subparagraphs (a) to (f) is sufficient in itself for
a person to be classified as a mercenary. All requirements must be
met before a person can be described as a mercenary.
The features of the definition contained in Article 47 are: money
is the basic motive in the decision to enlist; the recruitment and
enlistment is for the purpose of fighting in an armed conflict; the
person does participate in the combat; the person must be a non-
resident foreigner; and no one may be a mercenary who is a member
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or who has been sent
on official duty as a member of its armed forces by a State which
is not a party to the conflict. When interpreting the scope of each
element of the definition, it should be remembered that "the intention
in the Protocol ... was, on the one hand, to make a distinction
between mercenaries pursuing their own 'interests' and selfless in-
ternational volunteers, and on the other hand, to disregard the par-
ticular cause served by the mercenary, and even the fact that he used
his skill to illegal ends ... "29
Because the definition will determine who can be viewed as a
mercenary and, therefore, be denied prisoner of war status, each
element of the definition is of critical importance. As will be seen,
though, the definition in Protocol I creates as many problems as it
solves. By stating that a mercenary must be a person who is specially
recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict,
subparagraph (a) tried to clarify the position of volunteers. It excludes
from the definition volunteers who enter service on a permanent or
long-lasting basis in a foreign army as a result of an individual
enlistment (for example, the French Foreign Legion) or through an
arrangement by their national authorities.3 0 However, those included
in the subparagraph are volunteers who are specially recruited locally
or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict.
The second element of the definition is that to be a mercenary,
an individual must take a direct part in the hostilities. As Aldrich
explained, this subsection means that "even a mercenary is not a
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 850 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
30 Id. at 578. See also Yusuf, supra note 4, at 579.
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mercenary until he goes to combat."'" This condition excludes from
the definition foreign advisers and military technicians.3 2 As long as
the experts do not take any direct part in the hostilities, they are
regarded as civilians who do not participate in combat.33 Problems
exist however with this aspect of the definition as was demonstrated
when Polisario-the national liberation movement in the Sahara-
announced its intention to treat French technicians captured in Maur-
itania as mercenaries . 4 As Rosas stated: "[tihe distinction between
an adviser and a mercenary may be a matter of taste.""
The third feature of the definition is that money must be the basic
motive in the decision to enlist.36 The reference to motivation is
qualified by the requirement that material compensation be "sub-
stantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar
ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party." This test
was adopted so that a court could distinguish a mercenary from a
volunteer who, motivated by his ideals, accepts the usual or ordinary
conditions of pay of the other soldiers, and also to distinguish a
mercenary from other members of the regular armed forces.37 The
subparagraph also specifies that comparison of salaries between mer-
cenaries and other combatants must be made as regards similar ranks
and functions. As the Report of the Rapporteur specifies: "pilots
1, Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 776 (1981).
32 See Green, supra note 20, at 243. See also XV Official Records of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/407/Rev.1, para. 25,
at 454 (1978). Article 47(2) of Protocol I "excludes mere advisers by requiring that
to be a mercenary, one must in fact take a direct part in hostilities, that is, become
a combattant, albeit an illegitimate one."
33 Sandoz, supra note 29, at 579.
14 Le Polisario Traite en 'Mercenaires' les Techniciens Francais de Mauritanie,
LE MONDE, May 24-25, 1977, at 1, cited in Green, supra note 20, at 243.
11 A. ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PUSONERS OF WAR, 395 (1976).
36 It should be noted that the subparagraph gave rise to a number of criticisms.
For some, it was unclear that mercenaries are essentially motivated by private gain.
See XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
4th Sess., Doc. CCH/III/SR.57, para. 47 at 200 (1977) and DAvID, supra note 5,
at 577. It was also argued that the formulation would encourage the emergence of
a new category of mercenaries: those who base their actions on ideology. Doc.
CCH/III/SR.57, para. 21 at 193 (1977). And finally, it was advanced that "a party
to a conflict would be hard put to prove generous renumeration, since mercenaries'
wages were paid either in their own countries or into bank accounts in other
countries." Id.
31 Sandoz, supra note 29, at 479-80; Yusuf, supra note 4, at 117.
19921
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
would be judged by the same standards of compensation as other
pilots, not by the standard of infantrymen."3
The problem with this aspect of the definition is that not everyone
agrees that motivation should be a part of the definition. 9 For
example, in 1976 the Diplock Report, which examined the question
of the recruitment of mercenaries, noted that:
any definition of mercenaries which required positive proof of mo-
tivation would ... either be unworkable or so haphazard in its
application as between comparable individuals as to be unacceptable.
Mercenaries, we think, can only be defined by reference to what
they do, and not by reference to why they do it.40
That is why the Committee advised that mercenarism should not in
itself be made a crime, but that the recruitment in the U.K. of persons
to fight in foreign armed conflicts should be made an offense. The
main criticism of the motivation requirement is that, although the
subsection speaks of being "essentially" motivated by private gain,
the monetary reward is not always the main reason why people decide
to enlist in conflicts.4 '
The definition in Article 47 also excludes from the class of mer-
cenaries nationals of a party to the conflict and residents of territory
controlled by a party to the conflict. Although most mercenaries are
of a different nationality than their host, there is a danger that by
excluding from the definition of mercenaries nationals and residents
of a party, subparagraph (b) "may encourage nationals or residents
of a state which is a party to a conflict to enroll as mercenaries with
the forces fighting against the state of which they are nationals or
residents. "42
38 Report of the Rapporteur, XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Appli-
cable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/407/Rev.1, para. 26, at 511 (1977).
19 See, e.g., Burmester, supra note 22, at 37 (arguing that "in many cases,
monetary reward will not be the sole, or even primary, motivation which will lead
foreigners to participate in a conflict. Often, foreign volunteers will take part in an
armed conflict for political or ideological reasons").
40 Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to inquire into the
recruitment of mercenaries, Cmnd. 6569, para. 7 (August 1976).
41 Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification
of Additional Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 138 (1985) (arguing that most
participants in national liberation movements "are almost always motivated in part
by political convictions").
42 E. Kwakwa, The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict,
14 HAs]nNGs INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 67, 72 (1990).
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As regards sub-paragraph (e), it specifies that a mercenary cannot
be a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. The
main problem with this formulation is that it does not mention the
length of time that a person must be in the armed forces of a party
to the conflict. As Yusuf argues: "this raises a doubt as to whether
a person who enlisted in the armed forces of a foreign State or other
entity for that particular conflict should or should not be considered
a mercenary. ' 43 Because there is no specification on the question of
time, it is possible for parties to a conflict to disguise their use of
mercenaries by enlisting the mercenaries in their armed forces for the
duration of the conflict. It is this lack of specification which renders
the definition of mercenaries meaningless." As Best has argued: "[any
mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves
to be shot-and his lawyer with him." '45
Sub-paragraph (f) specifies that a mercenary is any person who
has not been sent on official duty as a member of its armed forces
by a State which is not a party to the conflict. This element of the
definition was inserted to emphasize the idea of the private, non-
governmental nature of a mercenary: a mercenary is one who enlists
on his own account.4 This formulation has also been criticized because
it "allows mercenaries to come through the backdoor as military
advisers, trainers, mechanics, etc." 47
Although the definition of a mercenary contained in Article 47 is
a welcome attempt to clarify, in an international instrument, just
who can be considered a mercenary, many problems remain with its
possible application, as can be gleaned from the discussion above.4
' Yusuf, supra note 4, at 117.
- XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
3d Sess., Doc. CDDH/236/Rev.1, para. 102, at 406 (1976).
41 G. BEST, HuMANITY IN WARFARE: TIE MODERN HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 328 n.83 (1980).
" Yusuf, supra note 4, at 117.
41 Peter, supra note 4, at 391.
, The Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights was also aware
of the definitional problems of Article 47 when he drew attention to the fact that:
(a) The definition of the mercenary in Article 47 refers to mercenaries in
situations of international armed conflict. Nowadays, it is in non-inter-
national armed conflicts that mercenaries are most often to be found.
Preventive and punitive legislative measures should be adopted for these
mercenary practices.
(b) The current definition refers solely to the mercenary, rather than to
the phenomenon of mercenarism, which is broader and more complex. The
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C. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing and Training of Mercenaries
Because of the numerous shortcomings of the definition of mer-
cenaries in Article 47 and because of the limited application of that
article, an Ad Hoc Committee within the United Nations was estab-
lished to draft a Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries.4 9 After nine years of debate, a Con-
vention was finally adopted in 1989.50 Although the definition of a
mercenary contained in the Convention is by no means perfect, the
Convention is still an important document because it is the only one
dealing directly with the question of mercenaries.
In Article I of the Convention, the term "mercenary" is defined
in the following manner:
mercenary has an individual responsibility for his acts, but he takes part
in a collective and complex offence involving the entity (group, organization
or State) which sponsors it, the recruiter, the funder, the supplier of arms,
the instructor, the carrier and, of course, the executing agent.
(c) The definition needs to be revised so that it incorporates different kinds
of mercenary activity, depending on the nature of the armed conflict in
which they occur ....
(d) The motives for mercenarism should be reviewed and treated more
flexibly, since material gain, i.e. money, is not necessarily the sole reason
for enlisting. The possibility of other factors should be considered, such
as ideological fanaticism, a desire for adventure, racism, an obsession with
war and other forms of psychological pressure which are relieved by the
exercise of violent military activity. It should be recognized that while
money is probably always an inducement, it is not the decisive factor in
all cases.
(e) It should be borne in mind that if article 47 is to be revised, or expanded
and incorporated in an international convention on the subject, that should
not have the effect of making it impossible in practice for the victim of
aggression to prove the existence of mercenary practices despite evidence
showing them to be an element in the situation. It is not desirable to make
the definition of "mercenary" applicable to all and sundry, but it is also
undesirable to go to the other extreme and set up requirements for proof
that will in the end make it easy for mercenaries to disguise themselves as
something else.
Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess. at
28-29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/14 (1988).
,9 In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training, of Mercenaries. See G.A. Res. 35/48, U.N. GAOR,
35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc. A/35/48.
"o G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 44th Sess., 72d plen. mtg., Annex,
Agenda Item 144, U.N. Doc. A/44/766 (1989). See infra notes 111-128 and text.
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1. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in
an armed conflict;
(b) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by
the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on
behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation sub-
stantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of
similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
(c) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident
of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
(d) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict; and
(e) Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining
the constitutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire
for significant private gain and is prompted by the promise
or payment of material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against
which such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose
territory the act is undertaken.
Article 2 of the Convention expands the definition of mercenary
by stating that:
Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries, as
defined in Article 1 of the present Convention, commits an offence
for the purposes of the Convention.
The first part of the definition in Article 1 simply reproduces the
main elements of Article 47 of Additional Protocol I. However, the
second part of Article 1 expands on and adds to the definition in
Article 47. As was stated by the Special Rapporteur, the second part
of Article 1, "gives States better protection against mercenary activ-
ities, in view of the variety of criminal and destabilizing ends for
which mercenaries are now used."'"
11 1990 Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess. at 23-24,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/ll (1990).
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Despite this major improvement, the criticisms advanced in con-
nection with Article 47 continue to be applicable under the Conven-
tion. Of particular disappointment is the fact that the question of
motives was not further elaborated and that the Convention did not
recognize that a mercenary need not be a foreigner. However, as is
evident from the Reports of the Ad Hoc Committee, no Convention
would have been adopted if the definition of mercenary had been
all-encompassing.52 Despite these problems the Convention broadens
and refines the definition of mercenary, and is therefore a welcome
addition.
D. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind
The International Law Commission in the context of its drafting
a Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind has
decided to include mercenarism among its acts which constitute an
offense. In his third report, the Special Rapporteur specified that he
was concerned with mercenaries "who have been specially recruited
for the purpose of attacking a country in order to destabilize or
overthrow the establishing authorities, for any number of reasons,
generally of an economic or political nature."" Article 18 of the
Draft Code, which was adopted at the Commission's forty-second
session, reflects this concern. The definition of a mercenary adopted
by the Commission is identical to the definition found in Article I
of the 1989 Convention. 4
IV. TOPOLOGY OF MERCENARISM
Mercenarism today has changed both in theory and in practice;
mercenaries are used in a variety of situations and contexts. As was
noted by the Special Rapporteur, these changes reflect the greater
complexity of international relations and the interaction between do-
52 See e.g. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries,
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/40/43 (1984); U.N. GAOR,
41st Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/41/43 (1986); U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp.
No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/42/43 (1987); U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N.
Doc. A/43/43 (1988); U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/44/43
(1989).
" See 1985 Y.B. INT'L L. 80 (Vol. II, pt. 1).
-1 For the text of Article 18 see Report of the International Law Commission,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990).
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mestic situations and international power structures.55 Any legal rem-
edies that are adopted to stop the practice of mercenarism must
reflect these changes.
A. Mercenarism in International Armed Conflicts
This is the traditional type of situation in which mercenaries are
involved. Under this heading fall the acts of aggression that were
perpetrated against the African people who were fighting for inde-
pendence. This type of mercenarism involves the planning, recruit-
ment, training, financing and use of mercenaries by one country
which is in an armed conflict with another, or which intervenes on
behalf of one party to a conflict and uses mercenary forces for this
purpose.5 6 The involvement of mercenaries usually arises in the context
of decolonization and their action is usually directed against the efforts
of national liberation movements that try to achieve self-determi-
nation. This type of mercenarism can be regarded as an internationally
wrongful act because it contravenes the rights of peoples to self-
determination and the rights of States to territorial integrity, inde-
pendence and sovereignty.
B. Mercenaries in Other Conflicts
Mercenaries are also used in non-international armed conflicts to
provoke an internal armed conflict or unrest, or to encourage existing
conflicts. As is explained by the Rapporteur, the goal of this type
of interference is to "impair the State's sovereignty, by bringing
about the overthrow of the Government, undermining the constitu-
tional order of the State, violating its territorial integrity and inde-
pendence or preventing it from making a free decision as to the
policies it considers appropriate for its social development and political
system. 57
C. Mercenaries and Those Who Hire Them
Before a mercenary becomes involved in a conflict, someone has
to plan and prepare all the stages leading up to the mercenary act
and someone has to pay the money that will be used to hire the
mercenary. Those who are involved in the planning, recruiting and
financing stages of the operation can also be characterized as par-
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ticipating in mercenarism. Punishment needs to be extended to anyone
involved in mercenarism. This principle must apply even if the culprit
is not an individual or an organization but is in fact a State. Indeed,
a State is often the one who organizes mercenary operations and uses
public funds for the carrying out of illegal acts. As was stated by
the Rapporteur: "responsibility must extend to the State, in that the
action is being taken in its name or on its behalf, and because the
crime was committed to further a specific aim and the political
interests of the State in question.""8
V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF MERCENARIES
AND THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE
RECRUITMENT AND USE OF MERCENARIES
A. Resolutions and Declarations
When the use of mercenaries began to be considered illegal under
international law in the 19th century, it was in the context of the
impartiality of neutral States. The accepted concept of neutrality was
established by the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention regarding
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of
War on Land.59 The relevant provisions state:
Art.4. Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies
opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.
Art.5. A neutral Power must not allow any [such] acts to occur on
its territory.
Art.6. The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the
fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services
to one of the belligerents. °
According to Article 4 of the Convention, a neutral State has the
obligation not to allow the formation of armed expeditions or to
permit recruiting to be done on its territory. 6' However, it does not
51 Id. at 32.
19 Hague Convention V of 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter Hague
Convention V], reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1908).
60 Id. at arts. 4-6. It must be noted that Article 6 of the Convention refers to
"persons crossing the frontier separately." The Convention however does not specify
what is meant by the word "separately." Green argues that "[p]resumably so long
as [such persons] do not constitute an organized corps of combatants no liability
on the part of the neutral state concerned could arise." Green, supra note 20, at
223.
61, Hague Convention V, supra note 59, at art. 4.
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have the obligation to prevent persons from crossing its borders to
enlist in the armed forces of a belligerent. 62
After World War II, attention was directed to controlling the use
of force and prohibiting unilateral violations of State autonomy. 6
The emphasis was no longer on a State's neutrality obligations, but
on the need to protect all States from the threat or use of force so
that they could maintain their territorial integrity and political in-
dependence.6 It is within this context that States tried to prohibit
the use of mercenaries. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
Nations615 reflects these concerns as it stipulates that:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations."
It was only in the 1960's, however, that a major change in attitude
occurred at the international level as regards the legality of merce-
naries. This change was brought about by the decolonization process
of peoples under colonial domination. At this stage, the international
community became concerned with the use of foreign mercenary forces
to prevent or hinder the exercise of the right to self-determination.
There was also concern that mercenary forces were used in attempts
to overthrow or destabilize some of the governments of the States
that had recently won their independence.
62 Id. States have tried of their own accord, however, to control the comings and
goings of their nationals when they intend to enlist in foreign forces. This is done
both in treaties and in domestic legislation. The Treaty of Amity with Great Britain,
for example, stipulated that the subjects and citizens of one State were not to serve
in the armed forces of any foreign prince or State, enemies to the other State.
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, signed at London, Nov. 19, 1794,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 21, 8 Stat. 116. The Treaty of Peace and Amity of the Central
American States provides at article 14 that "none of the Contracting Governments
will permit the persons under its jurisdiction to organize armed expeditions or to
take part in any hostilities which may arise in a neighboring country." General
Treaty of Peace and Amity of the Central American States, Feb. 7, 1923, art. 14,
reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 906 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1931). These
obligations, however, have been voluntarily assumed by States. They do not, as of
yet, reflect customary international law. See Burmester, supra note 22, at 42.
613 See Taulbee, supra note 14, at 345.
- Despite this goal, none of the major international instruments specifically
addressed the issue of the use and recruitment of mercenaries. Id.
65 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
66 Id.
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The first step the General Assembly took was to adopt the Dec-
laration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. 67 In this resolution, the General Assembly proclaimed the
"necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism
in all its forms and manifestations.'' 6 In the preamble to the Dec-
laration, the General Assembly referred to the "need for the creation
of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly
relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . "69
It expressed the belief that "in order to avoid serious crises, an end
must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and
discrimination associated therewith" and that "all peoples have an
inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty
and the integrity of their national territory.' '70 Paragraph 4 of the
Declaration further stated that:
All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise
peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the
integrity of their national territory shall be respected.7
It was during the struggle for independence in the Belgian Congo
that the international commitment to condemning the use of mer-
cenaries truly came to light. 72 During this conflict, the Security Council
and the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions which
urged that mercenaries, along with all foreign personnel, evacuate
the Belgian Congo. 71 In 1964, the OAU also appealed to the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo to end its recruitment of foreign soldiers
and to expel those who still remained in the country. 74






72 For more information, see generally MOCKLER, supra note 21; RicHARD G.
LAWSON, STRANGE SOLDEERING (1963); Surm HEM'STONE, REBELS, MERCENARIES AND
DmvmENns: THE KATANcA STORY (1962).
71 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
5002 (1961); S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4741
(1961).
74 OAU Doc. ECM/Res. 55 (III) (1964).
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In 1967, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which it
condemned "any state which persists in permitting or tolerating the
recruitment of mercenaries and the provision of facilities for them,
with the objective of overthrowing the Governments of States Mem-
bers of the United Nations." ' 7 The resolution further called upon
"[g]overnments to ensure that their territory and other territories
under their control, as well as their nationals, are not used for the
planning of subversion, and the recruitment, training and transit of
mercenaries designed to overthrow the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. ' 7 6 The resolution demonstrates that the in-
ternational community does not accept as a matter of fact the use
of mercenaries. It is, however, far from being a complete denunciation
of the use of mercenaries. Despite the resolution, doubts remained
regarding the obligations imposed on States to assure that their na-
tionals not join mercenary troops. As Green asserted: "it is clear
that the Security Council was not prepared to state that mercenarism
was a crime or that mercenaries were not entitled to treatment of
war or the protection of the international law of armed conflict. All
it was willing to do was call upon member States to take the measures
they might consider necessary to prevent mercenaries from taking
action against any State."' 77 Burmester also argued that the obligation
imposed on States by the Security Council was "in the exercise of
its powers to prevent a breach of the peace and related only to the
situation in the Congo and thus did not reflect a general norm of
international law." 78
7 S.C. Res. 239, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1367th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/
Rev. 2 (1967).
76 Id. Reference can also be made to a series of resolutions in which the Security
Council condemned Portugal's involvement in the conflict. In 1966, Congo accused
Portugal of allowing mercenaries to operate from its colonial territories against the
Congo. Although Portugal denied the allegation, the Security Council urged Portugal
"not to allow foreign mercenaries" to use Angola as a base. In 1967, the Council
further called upon "all countries receiving mercenaries who have participated in
the armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take appropriate
measures to prevent them from renewing their activities against any State." The
Council also condemned Portugal for having failed to "prevent the mercenaries
from using the territory of Angola under its administration as a base for operations"
against the Congo. Id.
" Green, supra note 20, at 195.
718 Burmester, supra note 22, at 49. It should be, however, noted that Yusuf,
supra note 4, at 121, argues that the United Nations was trying and did in fact
impose an obligation on States to prevent the enlistment of their nationals as
mercenaries in foreign conflicts.
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The second situation where the General Assembly became involved
with the use of mercenaries occurred when problems arose in the
territories under Portuguese administration. In 1968, the General
Assembly in Resolution 2395 condemned Portugal for its failure to
grant independence to the territories under its domination. 79 The
resolution further appealed to all States:
to take all measures to prevent the recruitment or training in their
territories of any persons as mercenaries for the colonial war being
waged in the Territories under Portuguese domination and for viol-
ations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the independent
African States.80
The language used in Resolution 2395 is very similar to that used in
the previous resolution. The same problems mentioned above, there-
fore, continue to apply.
A major step, however, was taken in 1968 when the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 2465 on the implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples."' In paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Assembly declared
that:
the practice of using mercenaries against movements for national
liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act and that
the mercenaries themselves are outlaws, and calls upon the Gov-
ernments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruit-
ment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory to be
a punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving
as mercenaries.12
In 1969, the Assembly reiterated its position on the question of
mercenaries in Resolution 2548,83 in Resolution 2708, and in 1970,
it stated once again that "the practice of using mercenaries against
national liberation movements in the colonial territories constitutes
a criminal act."
In 1970, the General Assembly again indirectly addressed the issue
of mercenaries when it adopted the Declaration on Principles of
,9 G.A. Res. 2395, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1730th mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/
7352 (1968).
so Id.
81 G.A. Res. 2465, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1751st mtg., U.N. Doc. A/L.560/
Rev.1, A/L.561/Add.1, A/L.563.
82 Id. at 8.
13 G.A. Res. 2548, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 1829th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/L.581/
Add.1 (1969). The language used in this resolution, as regards mercenaries, is the
same as the one found in Resolution 2465, supra note 81.
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International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.!
Under the principle that "States shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,''85 the following
statement appears:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging
the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mer-
cenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State. 6
Under the Declaration, however, the obligation of States in regard
to mercenaries continues to be limited. States need only control the
actual organization of mercenary and other irregular forces on their
territory; there is no obligation on States to prevent their nationals
from joining a mercenary force.8 7 This limited obligation on States
was also incorporated in the definition of aggression that was adopted
by the General Assembly in 1974.88 Among the acts in Article 3
described as constituting aggression is, "the sending by or on behalf
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against other States . ."89 The def-
inition continues by stating that:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3, could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and inde-
pendence . . . of peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . ., par-
ticularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms
of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to
that end and to seek and receive support .... 90
14 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8082
(1970).
85 Id. at Annex.
16 Id. at Annex.
17 See Burmester, supra note 22, at 43.
"R G.A. Res. 3314, 29th Sess., 2319th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974). For a
discussion of the resolution and of its effects see generally NICHOLAS NYIIU, THE
UNITED NATIONS' SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION (1989); BERT V.A.
ROLING, THE 1974 U.N. DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION, THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION
OF THE USE OF FORCE 413 (A. Casse ed., 1986); Bengt Broms, The Definition of
Aggression, 154 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
[R.C.A.D.I.] 300 (1977).
19 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 88, at Annex, art. 3.
90 Id. at art. 7.
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This definition of aggression neither extends a State's obligations
nor does it proscribe the actual organization of illegal forces. What
the definition proscribes is simply the sending of troops. 9' Further,
the resolution contributes little to the control of mercenary activities
because the use of mercenaries is irrelevant to the question of ag-
gression. Indeed, the actions of an attacking State constitute ag-
gression regardless of the nationality of the troops involved. The
resolution, therefore, provides no deterrence to mercenary warfare. 92
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the OAU also denounced
mercenary aggression and urged all States to adopt laws making the
recruitment and training of mercenaries a criminal offense. 93 As for
the Security Council, in 1970 it continued to condemn mercenaries,
this time in relation to New Guinea. 94 In 1973, the General Assembly
specifically addressed the issue of mercenary forces in colonial ter-
ritories. 95 In Resolution 3103, it reaffirmed its position that the prac-
tice of using mercenaries against national liberation movements in
the colonial territories constitutes a criminal act. 96 The General As-
sembly declared:
The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the
national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and in-
dependence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is
considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should accord-
ingly be punished as criminals. 97
At this point, despite the numerous resolutions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council, many problems remained con-
cerning the use and control of mercenaries. The resolutions of the
General Assembly which condemned mercenaries as outlaws did so
in the context of opposition to national liberation and independence
movements. Up until then, the General Assembly, "aware that its
91 See Burmester, supra note 22, at 43; Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in
the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1978).
92 See also P.W. Mourning, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment
and Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 594-95 (1982).
91 See, e.g., OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 49 (Sept. 1967); OAU Doc. ECM/Res. 17
(1970); OAU Doc. CM/St.6 (1971).
94 S.C. Res. 289, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1558th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/9988
(1970).
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Resolutions are only voeux did no more than call upon states to
make recruitment and enlistment of mercenaries for such campaigns
criminal offenses. It did not even go to the extent of calling upon
the International Law Commission to codify the law on mercenaries,
nor on the members of the United Nations to enter into negotiations
for a treaty to this end." 98 It would be a few more years before a
more definitive step would be taken towards curbing and outlawing
the use of mercenaries.
In 1977, the Security Council once again was faced with the problem
of mercenaries, this time in the People's Republic of Benin. In
Resolutions 405 and 419, 9 the Council denounced the use of mer-
cenaries and condemned any State which permitted or tolerated the
recruitment of mercenaries within its territory. It further urged States
to adopt measures to prohibit the recruitment, training and transit
of mercenaries on their territory. The resolution also condemned the
use of mercenaries as a means of interfering in the internal affairs
of States in order to destabilize them and to violate their territorial
integrity.'0° This is an important resolution because it specifically
refers to the use of mercenaries in attempts to overthrow or destabilize
governments. 101
98 Green, supra note 20, at 230.
- S.C. Res. 405, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2005th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/12322 (1977);
S.C. Res. 419, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., 2049th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/12454/Rev.1
(1977).
,0 Resolution 405 of April 1977 stipulates:
The Security Council,
3. Reaffirms its resolution 239 (1967) of 10 July 1967, by which, inter alia,
it condemns any State which persists in permitting or tolerating the re-
cruitment of mercenaries and the provisions of facilities to them, with the
objective of overthrowing the Governments of Member States;
4. Calls upon all States to exercise the utmost vigilance against the danger
posed by international mercenaries and to ensure that their territory and
other territories under their control, as well as their nationals, are not used
for the planning of subversion and recruitment, training and transit of
mercenaries designed to overthrow the Government of any Member State;
5. Further calls upon States to consider taking necessary measures to pro-
hibit, under their respective domestic laws, the recruitment, training and
transit of mercenaries on their territory and other territories under their
control;
6. Condemns all forms of external interference in the internal affairs of
Member States, including the use of international mercenaries to destabilize
States and/or to violate their territorial integrity, sovereignty and inde-
pendence.
S.C. Res. 405, supra note 99, at paras. 3-6; see also S.C. Res. 419, supra note 99.
101 G.A. Res. 34/140, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 104th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/
19921
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
In 1979, the General Assembly took another positive step in the
control of mercenaries, when in Resolution 34/140 it decided to
consider the drafting of an international convention to outlaw mer-
cenarism in all its manifestations. It was this initiative which led to
the adoption of a convention in 1989. The Assembly at that time
stipulated that "mercenarism is a threat to international peace and
security and, like murder, piracy and genocide, is a universal crime."
With this language, the Assembly went further than ever before in
its condemnation of mercenaries.
While the wording of the Convention was being debated, the Gen-
eral Assembly continued to condemn the use of mercenaries in a
series of resolutions.' °2 During the 1980s, the Commission on Human
Rights also discussed the problem of mercenaries in the context of
the right of peoples to self-determination. Just like the General As-
sembly, the Commission denounced the use of mercenaries against
developing countries and their use as a means of destabilizing a
government in place. 03
34/L.58/Add.1 (1979). Similar language was used by the Council in Resolutions 496
of December 1981 and 507 of May 1982. See S.C. Res. 496, U.N. SCOR, 36th
Sess., 2314th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2314 (1981); S.C. Res. 507, U.N. SCOR, 37th
Sess., 2370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/15127 (1982). Both resolutions condemn the use
of mercenaries against the Republic of Seychelles.
10,2 See G.A. Res. 45/132, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 68th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/45/
759 (1990); G.A. Res. 44/81, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 78th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
44/717 (1989); G.A. Res. 42/96, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 93d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
42/773 (1987); G.A. Res. 496, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 97th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
41/809 (1986).
103 See The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples
Under Control or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n.
Hum. Rts., 38th Sess., Supp. No. 2, 38th mtg., at 126, U.N. Doc. E/1982/16
(1982); The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples
Under Control or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n.
Hum. Rts., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 3, 22d mtg., at 120, U.N. Doc. E/1983/4 (1983);
Situation in Southern Africa, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 41st Sess., Supp.
No. 2, 32d mtg., at 25, U.N. Doc. E/1985/6 (1985); Situation in Southern Africa,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 42d Sess., Supp. No. 2, 50th mtg., at 84, U.N.
Doc. E/1986/26 (1986); The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the Exercise
of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts.,
42d Sess., Supp. No. 2, 50th mtg., at 84, U.N. Doc. E/1986/26 (1986); The Use
of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to
Self-Determination, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 5,
52d mtg., at 58, U.N. Doc. E/1987/16 (1987); The Use of Mercenaries as a Means
of Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 2, 29th mtg., at 35, U.N.
Doc. E/1988/7 (1988); The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the Exercise
of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts.,
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The sheer number of resolutions against mercenarism adopted by
international organizations underlines the importance of the issue,
particularly in the context of national self-determination, and the
awareness of the international community of its implications. The
resolutions also point to the fact that it is up to the States concerned
to take the necessary measures under their respective domestic laws
to prohibit the recruitment, financing, training and transit of mer-
cenaries on their territory and to prohibit their nationals from serving
as mercenaries. Although international condemnation may force in-
dividual States to enact the necessary legislation, the last step in
eradicating the practice of mercenarism remains within the realm of
individual States.
B. International Conventions
The first convention to deal with the subject of mercenaries was
adopted by the OAU. As noted earlier, a draft convention on the
elimination of mercenaries in Africa was submitted to the Assembly
of Heads of State of the OAU in 1972. In 1977, the OAU adopted
the Convention, which entered into force in 1985.104
It is not surprising that the first major legal enforcement system
directed towards the prohibition of mercenary activities came out of
Africa. Indeed, Africa is the continent that has been the most seriously
affected by mercenarism. Mercenaries were used against a number
of countries in order to curb their independence process and again
after independence was achieved, in order to infringe upon the sov-
ereignty of a number of States as well as their right to self-deter-
mination and their territorial integrity. 05
The OAU Convention defines mercenaries and mercenarism, which
are both outlawed. Under the Convention, the activity of mercenarism
is considered a crime against peace and security in Africa, whether
it is committed by an individual, a group, an association or a State.
The Convention also establishes individual criminal offenses. These
45th Sess., Supp. No. 2, 51st mtg., at 69, U.N. Doc. E/1989/21 (1989); The Use
of Mercenaries as a Means of Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to
Self-Determination, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2,
51st mtg., at 27, U.N. Doc. E/1990/7 (1990).
10 See supra part III B.
101 See generally David M. Isabirye, Mercenaries and International Criminal Law,
63 REVUE DE Dxorr INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCE s DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUES [R.D.
INT'L] 223, 237-38 (1985); U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/
14 (1988).
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include the activities that define mercenary under Article 1, as well
as the recruitment, training, and financing of mercenaries."
The Convention also establishes State obligations with regard to
the prevention of mercenarism. States must also communicate to
other member States any information relating to the activities of
mercenaries and they must adopt severe legislative measures in order
to punish the crime of mercenarism. 0 7 Further, States responsible for
criminal acts or omissions relating to the crime of mercenarism can
be accused before any competent OAU or international organization,
tribunal or body. I08 The Convention makes provisions for the juris-
diction of each State, extraditable cases, mutual assistance among
States parties, and rules for the settlement of disputes between States
regarding the interpretation and application of the provisions of the
Convention. It also establishes judicial guarantees for any person on
trial for the crime of mercenarism by stating that such person is
entitled to all the guarantees normally given to any ordinary person
by the State on whose territory he or she is being tried.
This Convention represented a significant step when it was adopted
in 1977-it was the first complete legal instrument to deal with the
problem of mercenaries.' °9 As the Special Rapporteur noted in 1988,110
this was the first instrument of international criminal law which was
applicable in the territory of the States party to the Convention and
to all persons covered by its provisions. It was also notable because
it imposed well defined obligations on each of the parties and stressed
the need to adopt appropriate measures in each State's domestic
criminal law. The only drawback to the Convention as an international
instrument was its regional character. It did not have a world-wide
effect; only the African States that ratified it were required to comply
with the Convention.
The International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Fi-
nancing and Training of Mercenaries was the second convention
against mercenarism to be adopted."' The Ad Hoc Committee man-
l0 OAU Convention, supra note 25, at art. 2.
107 OAU Convention, supra note 25, at arts. 3-4.
-o, OAU Convention, supra note 25, at art. 5.2.
10 For a discussion of the effects of the convention see Taulbee, supra note 14,
at 346-47; see also Mourning, supra note 92, at 600-601; see generally W. BURCHETT
& D. RoEBuCK, THE WHORES OF WAR: MERCENARIES TODAY (1977).
1o U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/14 (1988).
- G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 44th Sess., 72d plen. mtg.; Annex,
Agenda Item 144, U.N. Doc. A/44/766 (1989), reprinted in U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
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dated to draft the Convention first had to decide whether to emphasize
the punishment of mercenaries or whether to emphasize the illegality
of the actions of those promoting, organizing and tolerating such
activities. 2 The resulting Convention reflects mainly the first position,
that is, the importance of punishing the mercenaries themselves." 3
However, the Convention also attempts, to a lesser extent, to show
its disapproval towards and to punish those who promote or organize
mercenary activities. 14
Supp. No. 49, at 306, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990) [hereinafter Convention Against
Mercenaries]. The Convention enters into force 30 days after the deposit with the
Secretary-General of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession. Id.
at art. 19. The Convention has been signed and ratified by Suriname and acceded
to by Seychelles, and signed (but not ratified) by Italy, Zaire, Nigeria, the Congo,
Maldives, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Morocco, and Uruguay. U.N.
ESCOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/14 (1990).
"I Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Con-
vention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N.
GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/42/43 (1987).
113 See The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and Its Application to Peoples
Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, Written Statement
Submitted by the Andean Commission of Jurists, a Non-Governmental Organization
in Consultative Status, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1988/NGO/10 (1988).
"4 The aims of the Convention are expressed in its preamble which stipulates the
intent of States Parties:
Reaffirming the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations,
Being aware of the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries
for activities which violate principles of international law, such as those of
sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity of States and
self-determination of peoples,
Affirming that the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries
should be considered as offenses of grave concern to all States and that
any person committing any of these offenses should be either prosecuted
or extradited,
Convinced of the necessity to develop and enhance international co-operation
among States for the prevention, prosecution and punishment of such
offenses,
Expressing concern at new unlawful international activities linking drug
traffickers and mercenaries in the perpetration of violent actions which
undermine the constitutional order of States,
Also convinced that the adoption of a Convention against the recruitment,
use, financing and training of mercenaries would contribute to the eradi-
cation of these nefarious activities and thereby to the observance of the
purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter,
Cognizant that matters not regulated by such a convention continue to be
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The Convention takes account of the fact that mercenaries in
today's society continue to be used, recruited, financed and trained
for activities that are contrary to the principles of international law." 5
It establishes that these activities constitute offenses for which persons
must be prosecuted or extradited. The preamble also recognizes new
forms of mercenary activities, notably the link between drug traf-
fickers and mercenaries. As the Special Rapporteur in 1990 noted:
"The Convention thus contains an update that may help to ensure
stricter observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, without prejudice to the fact that issues not
covered will continue to be governed by the rules and principles of
international law."116
The definition of "mercenary" under Article I of the Convention
parallels that of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, save that the 1989 Convention Against Mercenaries
does not require a person to take direct part in any hostilities to be
considered a mercenary." 7 The Convention also stipulates that:
2. Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries,
as defined in Article 1 of the present Convention, commits an offence
for the purposes of the Convention.
3.(1) A mercenary, as defined in Article 1 of the present Convention,
who participates directly in hostilities or in a concerted act of
violence, as the case may be, commits an offence for the purposes
of the Convention.
governed by the rules and principles of international law,
Have agreed ....
Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 111, at Preamble.
"I The aims expressed in the preamble of the Convention are in accord with the
views of the Ad Hoc Committee as regards the position of international law. In
their report to the 36th session of the General Assembly the Committee stipulated
that:
Since the practice of resorting to mercenaries resulted in a direct form of
interventionism, it should be viewed as a threat to international peace and
security of mankind [-and thus an act of aggression-] and a dangerous
manifestation of international terrorism. The use of mercenaries against
national liberation movements similarly constituted a criminal act and mer-
cenaries themselves were criminals.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 43, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/36/43 (1981).
116 1990 Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., at 23, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1990/1 (1990).
117 See Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 111, at art. 1. For definition
of mercenary under Protocol I, see supra part III B.
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(2) Nothing in this article limits the scope of application of Article
4 of the present Convention.
4. An offence is committed by any person who:(a) Attempts to commit one of the offenses set forth in the
present Convention;
(b) Is the accomplice of a person who commits or attempts
to commit any of the offenses set forth in the present Con-
vention.
5.(1) States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries
and shall prohibit such activities with the provisions of the present
Convention.
(2) States Parties shall not recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries
for the purpose of opposing the legitimate exercise of the inalienable
right of peoples to self-determination, as recognized by international
law, and shall take, in conformity with international law, the ap-
propriate measures to prevent the recruitment, use, financing or
training of mercenaries for that purpose.
(3) They shall make the offenses set forth in the present Convention
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the
grave nature of the offenses.
6. States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offenses
set forth in the present Convention, particularly by:(a) Taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in
their respective territories for the commission of those offenses
within or outside their territories, including the prohibition of
illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that en-
courage, instigate, organize or encourage in the perpetration
of such offenses;
(b) Co-ordinating the taking of administrative and other meas-
ures as appropriate to prevent the commission of those of-
fenses.
7. States Parties shall co-operate in taking the necessary measures
for the implementation of the present Convention."'
Other articles which refer to the procedures for the implementation
of the provisions of the Convention include: the establishment of
jurisdiction by each State Party (art. 9); custody of an alleged offender
in the territory of a State Party and the relevant notifications (art.
10); fair treatment (art. 11); extraditable offenses (art. 15); and dis-
putes (art. 17). 119
"I Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 111, at arts. 2-7.
,19 Id. at arts. 9-11, 15, 17.
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The Convention, as adopted, confirms the judicial character of the
United Nations resolutions and declarations condemning mercenary
activities. 20 It broadens the scope of the international regulations
dealing with the issue: before the adoption of the Convention, the
main juridical instrument that could be used under international law
was Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949. This article was limited to international armed conflicts and
simply denied mercenaries the status of prisoner of war. A more
comprehensive measure was needed if mercenaries were to be con-
trolled. Further, the Convention, if followed by States, will help
guarantee the right of peoples to self-determination and it will ensure
a certain stability to lawfully constituted governments. As the Special
Rapporteur in his 1991 report noted:
The formulation of broader, more comprehensive and more precise
international regulations updated to take account of the forms which
mercenarism has assumed in recent years with the aim of over-
throwing Governments and undermining the constitutional order or
territorial integrity of States highlights the importance of this new
multilateral instrument and the necessity and desirability of its prompt
entry into force.' 2'
A number of problems, however, remain in the application of the
Convention. First, Article 9 of the Convention, which outlines the
jurisdiction of States over the crime of mercenarism, stipulates that
a State shall have jurisdiction when the offense is committed in its
territory (or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State) and
when the offense is committed by any of its nationals. The jurisdiction
granted to States is far more restrictive and falls well short of the
jurisdiction given to States with respect to universal crimes such as
piracy and genocide. 122 If mercenarism and the activities of merce-
naries are to be eradicated, these activities must be viewed as universal
-2 See U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 35,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/14 (1990).
121 Id.
'22 The fact that mercenarism was not declared a universal crime seems to be the
result of Western influences. For example, in 1980, an Italian representative to the
United Nations declared that it would be "inappropriate . . . to qualify recourse to
mercenaries as a crime against humanity in the same category as piracy or genocide."
See Drafting of an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 366, Agenda Item
29, Addendum pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/35/366/Add.2 (1980).
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crimes, thus giving all States jurisdiction to punish such crimes. The
inclusion of an article dealing with mercenaries and the activity of
mercenarism in the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind is, however, a step in the right direction.
A second objection to the Convention is that it does not address
the treatment of both aggrieved and offending countries, as was the
case in the earlier drafts.'23 In these drafts, Article 2 of the Convention
defined the crime of mercenarism as an offense "against the peace
and security of a State." Article 15 established the right of the injured
State to claim reparation against any State guilty of an act or omission
which constituted an offense as outlined in Article 2.124 Despite the
fact that this right was limited to situations in which the damaged
party had been unable to secure criminal prosecution of the individual
offenders, it encouraged States both to aid in the enforcement of
the law against mercenaries and to take measures aimed at the pre-.
vention of mercenary activity within their jurisdiction. 125 By creating
such an encompassing system of State responsibility, the Convention
encouraged the international effectiveness of anti-mercenary law.1 26
The third problem with the Convention is that it does not provide
for any monitoring machinery. 127 Unless the Commission on Human
Rights itself assumes a monitoring function, it will be impossible to
determine if the obligations created by the Convention are met.
123 Drafting of an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Fi-
nancing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 366,
Agenda Item 29, Addendum pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/35/366/Add.1 (1980) (Nigerian
Draft Convention).
124 Nigerian Draft Proposal, supra note 26, at art. 15(2) stipulates:
The State Party which has suffered damages by reason of the commission
of the offence mentioned in article 2 of this Convention may also claim
damages or reparation against any State Parties jointly or severally for any
act or omission which constitutes the offence.
' See Nigerian Draft Proposal, supra note 26, at art. 15(3); Mourning, supra
note 92, at 605.
126 Western States opposed the idea that a State which fails to prevent mercenary
activity should be liable for damages to the victim for such an omission. Their
representatives argued that Article 15 had no parallel in other conventions. These
States also argued that while a breach of international obligations gives rise to
responsibility, the question of reparation should be 'left to customary practice. See
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. GAOR,
37th Sess., Supp. No. 43, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. A/37/43 (1982).
127 This problem was discussed by the Special Rapporteur in his 1990 Report.
U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess. at 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/1 (1990).
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C. Trials of Mercenaries
The trials of mercenaries, and the rules applied to them during
their trials, are good examples of how the international community
has tried to cope with the rules of international law. In Africa, for
example, a number of trials are known to have taken place. These
include the trial in Conakry of the mercenaries who invaded Guinea
in 1970, the trial of Rolf Steiner in the Sudan in 1971, the trial of
thirteen mercenaries in Angola in 1976, and the trial of mercenaries
in the Seychelles in 1981.121
The first trial to receive world-wide attention was that of Rolf
Steiner in the Sudan. 129 Steiner joined the Anyanya rebel army in
Sudan and aided them in waging a war against the government. Later
he was arrested by Ugandan authorities in Uganda and handed over
to the Sudan. He was tried in 1971 and charged with violations of
domestic law. Steiner was not convicted of the crime of being a
mercenary because the penal code of Sudan did not include the crime
of mercenarism. During the trial, the court recognized that Steiner's
acts by their nature constituted a political crime, but the court rejected
international law as a possible source because there was no "une-
quivocal and uniform yard-stick as to what is and what is not a
political offense to make it a rule of international law."' 30 Notwith-
standing the fact that he was not convicted of the crime of mercen-
arism (which was not considered a crime under the national legislation),
he was convicted of violating specific offenses under Sudanese law. 3'
He was found guilty and sentenced to death, but the sentence was
later commuted to twenty years imprisonment.
The second sensational trial was that of thirteen mercenaries in
Angola.3 2 In 1976, the mercenaries were captured while on patrol
and were later indicted by the People's Revolutionary Court of An-
121 For a brief description of the case of the captured mercenaries in the Seychelles
see Isabirye, supra note 105, at 245-46.
129 For a general discussion, see In the Trial of F.E.R. Steiner-A Court Martial,
1971 SuDANr L. J. REP. 147.
130 Id. at 152.
- For a general discussion of the case, see Peter, supra note 4, at 385-86, and
Isabirye, supra note 105, at 242.
132 For a complete description of the trial, see Mike J. Hoover, Note, The Laws
of War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs of War, 9 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 323 (1977); see generally Marcum, Lessons of Angola, 54
FoREIGN APt. 407 (1976); see also Ebinger, External Interventions in Internal War:
The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War, 20 ORBIS 669 (1976).
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gola. 33 The indictment first charged all thirteen defendants with the
crime of being mercenaries. 3 4 The defendants were accused of vio-
lating two OAU resolutions'35 and four United Nations resolutions. 13 6
The defendants were also charged with crimes against peace, in vi-
olation of the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tri-
bunal, as confirmed by U.N. Resolution 95(1) of December 1946.117
All the defendants were accused of "murders, maltreatment, insults
and harassment of members of the civilian population; murder of
MPLA members, of other mercenaries, and of other FNLA soldiers;
kidnapping of civilians and stealing of their property . . . . '" I Finally,
the indictment charged each defendant separately with specific crimes. 3 9
The court convicted all thirteen defendants on the charge of being
mercenaries.'14 Nine were given prison sentences and four were sen-
tenced to death. The court prefaced its judgment by referring to the
existence of mercenarism in traditional penal law. It stated that
"mercenarism was not unknown in traditional penal law where it
was always dealt with in relation to homicide.' ' 41 The court at this
point seemed to be arguing that when an individual is accused of
mercenarism it is important to look beyond the term and examine
113 The captured mercenaries consisted of one Irish, nine British and three United
States citizens. Hoover, supra note 132, at 327.
1-1 For the text of the indictment see id. at 352-74.
135 Statement of the Heads of States and Governments of the Member Countries
of the Organisation of African Unity, Sept. 11-14, 1967, AHG/Res. 49 (IV) (Kinshasa,
Congo); Statement on Mercenary Activities in Africa, June 21-23, 1971, CM/St. 6
(XVII) (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).
136 G.A. Res. 2395, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess. 1, Supp. 18, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/
7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2465, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. 18, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2548, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. 30, at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. 30, at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
13, Hoover, supra note 132, at 371.
138 Id. at 372.
119 C. Georgiou was charged with the murders of civilians, FAPLA soldiers, and
other mercenaries. McKenzie was charged with stealing and destruction of military
and civilian equipment and property, with maltreatment and kidnapping of civilians,
and with the murder of other mercenaries. As for McIntyre, Marchant, Evans, and
Wiseman, they were charged with being members of Georgiou's contingent and with
killing FAPLA soldiers in combat. The other defendants were accused generally of
participating in armed actions against FAPLA forces, and Gearhart was specifically
charged with soliciting his role as a mercenary by placing an advertisement in Soldier
of Fortune magazine. Id. at 334.
,40 See id. at 374 for the text of the judgment.
141 Id. at 379.
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the common crimes it encompasses such as murder, rape and so on. 142
This would mean that defendants could be convicted for common
crimes that are recognized and defined in national legislation. The
court stated that:
Yet it is important that in modern penal law, and in the field of
comparative law, the mercenary crime lost all autonomous existence
and was seen as a common crime, generally speaking aggravated
by the profit motive which prompts it. And this mercenary crime,
which is known today as "paid crime to order", comes within the
laws of criminal complicity, it being through them that the respon-
sibility of he who orders and he who is ordered is evaluated. 143
As Lockwood argues, this part of the judgment seemed to categorize
the crime of mercenarism as a common crime. 1" The court then
concluded this section of the judgment by stating that:
In our case, mercenarism is provided for in Art. 20 No. 4 of the
Penal Code in force. This annuls the objection of the defence that
the crime of mercenarism has not been defined and that there is
no penalty for it. It is in fact provided for with penalty in most
evolved penal systems. As a material crime, of course!' 4
With this statement the court seemed to be coming back to its
original position, stating that the crime of mercenarism includes, and
consists of, specific crimes that exist in all penal systems. The court
then referred to the resolutions of the United Nations and to the
statements of the OAU in order to affirm that mercenarism is con-
sidered a crime by all nations and that the mercenaries need to be
punished.'" The court also referred to the resolutions to affirm that:
[A]cceptance is given to the allegation of the defence that the
defendants are not solely guilty. Also guilty, alongside them, are
the governments of the countries of which they are nationals, which
encouraged their recruitment, armed them and paid them wages.
Governments persisting in their racist philosophies and blinded by
imperial delirium, which have disregarded UN Resolution 2465, and
again shown themselves to be against peace for the peoples and
142 See George H. Lockwood, Report on the Trial of Mercenaries: Luanda, Angola,
7 MANrroBA L. J. 183, 198 (1977).
143 Hoover, supra note 132, at 379.
"4 Lockwood, supra note 142, at 199.
" Hoover, supra note 132, at 379-80.
,,6 Id. at 380.
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unworthy of sharing the company of the community of civilized
nations.
1 41
The court's reliance on the U.N. and O.A.U. resolutions has been
widely criticized on the basis that the resolutions did not confer on
the Angolan court the necessary basis for finding the defendants
guilty because the resolutions did not create law.'4 One should note,
however, that despite the validity of this criticism, and the conclusion
that "no nation . . . can create precedent by its own acts which are
contrary to existing law,"' 49 there is no denying that the trial played
an important role in defining the crime of mercenarism, for it showed
the inadequacies of international law at that time and drew attention
to the problem of the use of mercenaries.
The third trial dealing with the problem of mercenaries is that of
Nicaragua against the United States. Although this case is somewhat
different from the two discussed above, in that it does not deal with
the direct prosecution of individuals but with a government's accu-
sation that another government is using mercenaries in its country,
the trial nonetheless shows the evolution of the crime of mercenarism
and its acceptance in international law.
In 1986, the International Court of Justice handed down a judgment
on the merits of the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Ac-
tivities in and Against Nicaragua."0 Before the Court, Nicaragua
argued it was the victim of foreign economic and armed aggression
147 Id.
148 For example, Hoover draws attention to the fact that although the New People's
Republic of Angola had been recognized by the OAU, it was not a member of the
U.N. Id. at 350-51. Secondly, the resolutions when read together simply called upon
member States to enact legislation into their own penal codes in order to prohibit
the crime of mercenarism. No such statute was passed by the Council of Revolution
at the time the defendants were captured. Finally, although the resolutions did show
a trend towards a condemnation of the activities of mercenaries, they left it up to
each State to define the precise substance and scope of the crime in their national
legislation. Several authors argue that the resolutions are declarations rather than
laws. See Isabirye, supra note 105, at 244; Green, supra note 20, at 200; and Cesner
& Brant, Law of the Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 339,
349 (1977). According to Cesner and Brant, "these declarations are by their terms
nothing more than a collective group of resolutions seeking to define the problem
of mercenary activities and requesting sovereign nations to take action against those
who promote such conduct." Censner & Brant, supra, at 349.
t49 Cesner & Brant, supra note 148, at 355.
I" Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
For the provisional order of the International Court of Justice, see Case Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 750 (1984).
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which created an internal armed conflict, that the United States was
responsible for overt and public acts of intervention against the
government of Nicaragua, and that these acts violated international
law and agreements that bound the two nations. Nicaragua invoked
the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization
of American States, and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua."' Although the
United States was not present during the proceedings, 5 2 its position
was that its actions were justified as an exercise of the right of
collective self-defense.
Regarding the issue of mercenaries, Nicaragua asserted that the
United States authorized, created, and organized a mercenary army,
the forces of the contras, which were involved in activities that were
hostile to the government of Nicaragua. 13 Nicaragua's contention
"I The substance of the charges made by Nicaragua were that: 1) the United
States, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise
encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in
and against Nicaragua has violated and is violating its Charter and treaty obligations
to Nicaragua. Violations include Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United
Nations, Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,
Article 8 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States and
Article 1, paragraph 3 of the 1928 Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights
of States in the Event of Civil Strife; 2) the United States was violating the sovereignty
of Nicaragua by armed attacks against Nicaragua, by incursions into its territorial
waters and its air space, and by trying to intimidate the government of Nicaragua;
3) the United States was using force and the threat of force against Nicaragua, and
was intervening in its internal affairs, creating a situation of internal conflict; and
4) the United States has a duty to cease and desist from the use of force against
Nicaragua, from violating the territorial integrity of Nicaragua, from supporting
those who are engaged in military and paramilitary actions against Nicaragua and
from trying to block or impede the economic activities of Nicaragua. 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. at 750-52.
,52 On April 6, 1984, the United States Secretary of State delivered a letter to the
Secretary General of the United Nations purporting to withdraw the United States
consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for a period of two
years with respect to disputes arising out of the situation in Central America. See
United States: Letter to U.N. Secretary General Concerning Non-Applicability of
Compulsory Jurisdicton of the International Court of Justice with Regard to Disputes
with Central American States, 23 I.L.M. 670 (1984). On January 18, after the Court
had upheld its jurisdiction to hear the complaint, the government of the United
States announced that it would not participate in the case and that it would not
appear in the proceedings on the merits. See U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings
Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64 (statement
of U.S. Department of State, Jan. 18, 1985).
,51 On the question of the use and financing of mercenaries, Nicaragua adopted
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was that the acts committed by the contras were the acts of the
United States.
The Court in its judgment rejected a number of Nicaragua's ar-
guments, in particular its contention that the contra forces had been
created, directed, and controlled by the United States to such a degree
as to make them in effect the agents of the United States. 5 4 The
Court on the issue of the use of force found that the United States,
by directly attacking Nicaragua through the actions of its officials
and individuals acting on its behalf, had infringed the principle of
the prohibition in customary international law against the threat or
use of force without justification against another nation. 5 The Court
also held that the United States had violated the prohibition against
its own definition of what constitutes a mercenary. As is stated in the 1989 Report
of the Special Rapporteur, Nicaragua does not adopt the definition of mercenary
that appears in Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess. at 38-39, U.N. tDoc. E/CN.4/1989/14 (1989). The Rap-
porteur notes:
[Nicaragua] objects to th[el definition since, in its opinion, the mercenary
cannot be defined exclusively on the basis of nationality, since mercenarism
takes a form proper to the nature of the act itself, the ignoble motivation,
the retribution and the transgression of international law. Nicaragua's def-
inition of the mercenary derives from the armed conflict in which it is
engaged and cannot be understood in isolation from the origin, scope and
nature of the conflict.
The starting point of the Nicaraguan case ... is that Nicaragua is being
subjected to external aggression aimed at impairing the right to self-deter-
mination of the Nicaraguan people. The United States Government is re-
sponsible for that aggression and has recruited, trained and financed
Nicaraguans and other nationals for that purpose since 1981. On the basis
of this premise, the Nicaraguan case dispenses with the factor of nationality,
since it considers all those recruited in that way to be "mercenaries" or
"mercenary gangs".
... It is argued that the contras are merely gangs of mercenaries recruited,
organized, paid and commanded by the United States Government. Con-
sequently, they have no genuine independence vis-a-vis the United States
Government. The consequence drawn from that premise is that the unlawful
acts committed by the contras are imputable to the United States Govern-
ment, as would be the case of any other force placed under its authority.
The other consequence of this premise is that, as far as Nicaragua is
concerned, the military and paramilitary attacks inflicted on it do not
constitute a case of civil strife; they are essentially acts committed by the
United States, through mercenary gangs.Id.
54 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 53-
65 (June 27).
"I See id at 118.
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the use of force by arming and training of the contras.156 The Court
did not consider simply supplying funds to the contras as a use of
force in violation of international law, but rather a violation of the
principle of non-intervention. 117 The Court also found, however, that
the actions of the contras could not, as a whole, be imputed to the
United States.'
In regard to the principle of non-intervention, the Court found
that the contras' goal was the overthrow of the government and that
support of such a group was impermissible. The Court found that
"the support given by the United States, up to the end of September,
1984, to the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in
Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply of weapons, intel-
ligence and logistic support, constitute a clear breach of the principle
of non-intervention. ' '" 59
Although the Court nowhere referred to the issue of mercenaries, it
did conclude in section 3 of its judgment that:
the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, fi-
nancing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging,
supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in
breach of its obligations under customary international law not to
intervene in the affairs of another State .... 160
The Court also found that the actions of the United States which
violated the principles of the non-use of force and nonintervention
also violated the principle of State sovereignty, which was a norm
of customary international law.' 61
156 Id.
-' Id. at 118-19.
"I Id. at 64-65.
59 Id. at 124.
'6 Id. at 146.
"I See id. at 147. For a complete analysis of the Court's judgment, see James
P. Rowles, Nicaragua Versus the United States: Issues of Law and Policy, 20 INT'L
LAw. 1245 (1986); Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, The United States, and the World
Court, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1445 (1985).
One should note that Nicaragua also lodged a complaint to the Special Rapporteur
in regard to the use of mercenaries against the government of Nicaragua. In his
1989 report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that:
the presence of foreigners answering to the description of mercenary agents
involved in the Nicaraguan conflict on behalf of one of the parties to the
conflict-the contra forces-is something of which there is proof, as things
now stand within the terms of article 47 of Additional Protocol I. Such
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Finally it is important to note that the non-nationals who were
captured and tried by the Nicaraguan courts in connection with the
armed conflict were not tried or sentenced as mercenaries. Despite
the fact that Nicaragua described these persons as mercenaries, there
was nothing in Nicaraguan law that established mercenarism as an
offense. Captured non-nationals were therefore tried for offenses
against public order and safety. 62
VI. HUMANITARIAN LAW, MERCENARIES, AND THE STATUS OF
PRISONERS OF WAR
Because in earlier days (prior to the 1900's) mercenaries were
respected professionals, they were usually accorded the status of
prisoner of war when captured.' 63 During the 20th century this position
persisted for some time. Under the early laws of war, aliens who
enlisted in a foreign force committed no offense against international
law. When they were captured, therefore, they were treated the same
as the nationals of the State whose force they had joined.' 64 Article
17 of the Hague Convention of 1907 provided that a neutral could
not avail himself of his neutrality if he voluntarily enlisted in the
armed forces of one of the parties and that:
In such a case, the neutral shall not be more severely treated by
the belligerent as against whom he has abandoned his neutrality
than a national of the other belligerent State could be for the same
act. 165
The question of the protection of prisoners of war was widely
considered in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.'" The Convention, however, contains no article
persons were recruited to fight in an armed conflict, did take part in the
hostilities, received material compensation for it, were not Nicaraguan
nationals and were not on official duty as members of the armed forces
of another State, since there is no State that admits to being a party to
the armed conflict in Nicaragua. In short, they did not take part for their
own ends, but on behalf of those recruited to help them overthrow the
Nicaraguan government.
U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess. at 47, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/14 (1989).
162 Id.
163 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the status of mercenaries as
prisoners of war see John R. Cotton, Comment: The Rights of Mercenaries as
Prisoners of War, 77 MI. L. REv. 143 (1977).
164 20PPENHEIMS INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
165 Hague Convention V of 1907, 36 Stat. 2310.
"6 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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which deals specifically with the question of mercenaries.' 67 Despite
this lack of mention, under the 1949 Geneva Convention mercenaries
are entitled to prisoner of war treatment. 16s The main provision
granting this protection is Article 4 of the Geneva Convention.'69
167 Cotton argues that this lack of mention of the status of mercenaries can be
interpreted in two ways. He advances that:
It is possible that the lack of specific consideration or mention was inten-
tional, and that as a result, mercenaries are specifically excluded from the
class of individuals protected by the Convention. On the other hand, it is
possible that the Convention was intended to be general in character and
that in light of historical precedent at the time of the drafting of the
Convention, mercenaries were assumed to fall within one of the protected
categories.
Cotton, supra note 163, at 155.
,61 See, e.g., Van Deventer, supra note 27, at 811; Schwarzenberger, supra note
4, at 280-82. Some authors, however, argue that the fact that mercenaries fight for
money sets them apart from other members of the armed forces. For example,
Mallison & Mallison mention that:
Neither Art. 9 of the Brussels Declaration, nor Art. 1 of the Hague
Regulations, nor Art. 4 of the 1949 Conventions provides legal authority
for armed bands of marauders or pirates acting principally for private
purposes as opposed to public ones. Even if such bands used an internal
military-like discipline, they could not meet the Brussels-Hague-Geneva
criteria.
W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Com-
batants Under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 39, 50 (1977).
169 Article 4 states:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power
of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, as well as
members of militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militia and members of other volunteer corps, in-
cluding those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied provided that such militia or volunteer corps, including
such organized resistance movements fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government
or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being mem-
bers thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
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Under the Convention, it can be argued that mercenaries, if they are
members of the "armed forces of a Party to the conflict" or of
''militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces" or
if they meet the requirements in Article 4, subparagraph A(2), are
entitled to prisoner of war status. 70 If these standards are not met,
mercenaries who are involved in international armed conflicts are
treated like any other civilians who have taken up arms-that is, like
unprivileged belligerents-and they are subject to trial and punishment
by the detaining power.' 7 ' In situations of non- international armed
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the
annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict,
who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions
of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non occupied territory, who on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they
carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the
present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the
occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason
of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated
them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in
particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin
the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat,
or when they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view
to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present
Article, who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent Powers on
their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under inter-
national law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which
these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10,
15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist
between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or nonbelligerent Power
concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such
diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons
depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a
Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice
to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with
diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950).
110 See id. at art. 6.
1' See Van Deventer, supra note 27, at 811.
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conflicts, mercenaries have no protection except those provided by
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. 7 2
The question of the status that should be given mercenaries was
also discussed during the Angolan trial of thirteen mercenaries. The
Angolan court on this issue stated that:
the defendants cannot claim the status of prisoners of war, for the
definitive reason that they are irregular members of an army. And
it is already on record that in U.N. resolutions a mercenary is
regarded as a common criminal. 1
71
This position was reaffirmed by the International Commission of
Enquiry on Mercenaries in the Draft Convention on the Prevention
and Suppression of Mercenarism, which followed the decision of the
Angolan Court. Article 4 of the Draft Convention stipulated that
mercenaries are not lawful combatants and that they were not entitled
to prisoner of war status (for text of the Draft Convention, see
172 Article 3 of the Convention provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party in the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arm and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above- mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to the life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by
means of special agreement, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status
of the Parties to the conflict.
Geneva Convention, supra note 169, at art. 3.
173 Hoover, supra note 132, at 380-381 (reproducing verdict of People's Revolu-
tionary Court of Angola, June 19, 1976).
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Hoover, supra note 132, at 404). The OAU Convention also stipulated
that mercenaries cannot be granted the status of prisoner of war.
The issue of the status of mercenaries was once again discussed
during the debates of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts. 74 During the second session, a number of delegates
affirmed that Protocol I should deny combatant status to mercenaries
used in a conflict with a national liberation movement or against the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State. 75 However, no con-
sensus on this question was reached. The issue was once again raised
by the Nigerian delegation in 1976 when it proposed a draft amend-
ment to Article 42 of Protocol I. The amendment affirmed that "the
status of a combatant or prisoner of war shall not be accorded to
any mercenary who takes part in armed conflicts referred to in the
Conventions and the present Protocol.' '76
The main criticism of the Nigerian proposal was that it was too
categorical. Many delegations felt that it was up to the capturing
power to decide whether it would accord prisoner of war or combatant
status to mercenaries. 77 As the International Committee of the Red
Cross noted, the Nigerian proposal "would have led to a surprising
situation for a humanitarian text, since any Contracting Party ac-
cording such status to a mercenary, would then have violated the
Protocol."'' 7 The provision which was finally adopted in 1977 reflects
114 See supra part III B.
1" See V Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
3d Sess., Doc. CDDH/SR.33 at 379-92 (1976); VI Official Records of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/SR.34-37 at 19-64
(1977). Protocol I, entitled Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, is reproduced with comments by the International Committee of the Red
Cross in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE AD-
DITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 at 19 (Yves Sandoz et. al. eds., 1987).
116 See III Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
3d. Sess., Doc. CDDH/III/GT/82 at 192 (1976).
," See XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/III/361 (Add.1) (1976); III Official Records of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 3d. Sess., Doc. CDDH/III/GT/97 (1976).
178 See Sandoz et. al., supra note 175, at 575.
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this concern.' 79 Article 47 of Protocol I stipulates that "[a] Mercenary
shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.' 80
The article as formulated allows each contracting State to decide for
itself whether it will grant to mercenaries the status of a prisoner of
war. As Yusuf points out, "as it appears now, the provision is
addressed to the mercenary rather than to a party to the conflict. A
mercenary cannot claim the status of a prisoner of war, nor pretend
to be treated as such, although no obligation is imposed on the
Detaining Power to deny him such status.'' s8
The effect of Article 47, in denying prisoner of war status, is to:
deprive the mercenary of the treatment of prisoner of war as laid
down in the Third Convention, and to make him liable to criminal
prosecution. Such prosecution can be instigated both for acts of
violence which would be lawful if performed by a combatant, in
the sense of the Protocol, and for the sole fact of having taken a
direct part in hostilities .... 112
Because a mercenary is deprived of the status of combatant and
prisoner of war, he becomes a civilian, and therefore can fall under
Article 5 of the Fourth Convention.8 3 One should note, however,
that before a mercenary can be deprived of the status of prisoner
of war, there must be a decision based on the definition of paragraph
2 of Article 47 that he is in fact a mercenary. The rule is that,
pending a final determination by a competent tribunal,'8 the accused
'19 Article 47 was adopted by consensus at a plenary meeting. VI Official Records
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/SR.41,
at 156 (1977). For a discussion of the article and its problems see Sandoz et. al.,
supra note 175, at 156-161, 175-176, 182, 184-185, 191-194, 197-198, and 202-204.
110 For a criticism of the article as adopted see R.C. HiNGORANI, PluSONERS OF
WAR 63 (1982).
"I YusuF, supra note 4, at 124. See also BoTHE, PARTSCH, & SOLF, NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 at 270 (1982).
112 Sandoz et. al., supra note 178, at 575.
"3 As the International Committee of the Red Cross notes: "[i]t is precisely this
article which removes an important part of the guarantees from any person under
legitimate suspicion of being engaged in an activity endangering State security." Id.
184 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), June 8, 1977, art. 5, para. 2, (Appointment of Protecting Powers and of Their
Substitutes), reproduced in Sandoz et. al., supra note 175, at 75; Protocol I, art.
45 (Protection of Persons Who Have Taken Part in Hostilities), reproduced in
Sandoz et. al., supra note 175, at 543.
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person is presumed to be a prisoner of war 185 and is therefore protected
by the Third Convention. 86
If the competent tribunal decides that the captured person is a
mercenary under the definition of paragraph 2 of Article 47, then it
seems that Article 75 dealing with fundamental guarantees applies.
1 17
Although the Protocol does not specifically mention that Article 75
will apply, the Rapporteur's report notes that "although the proposed
new article makes no reference to the fundamental protections of
Article 65 [75], it was understood by the Working Group that mer-
cenaries would be one of the groups entitled to the protections of
Article 65 [75]." 188 Further, this explanation was accepted at a plenary
meeting by the representative of Nigeria, 1 9 and it was confirmed by
a number of statements by other delegates. 9°
Despite the clear language of Article 47 of Protocol I, it must be
remembered that the article deals only with international armed con-
flict. Therefore, mercenaries who are involved in non-international
conflicts are not covered by the Protocol. As the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross notes:
[11n case of capture, these mercenaries undeniably benefit from the
protection of Article 3 of the Conventions, and the corresponding
provisions of Protocol II, when the latter is applicable, as well as
from the provisions of international human rights legislation, when
these apply. In fact, the person concerned will not normally be
prosecuted on account of his mercenary status, but for endangering
State security. 191
VII. MERCENARIES IN TODAY'S SOCIETY
Why anyone today would want to be employed as a mercenary
remains a mystery. Many reasons are advanced, however, to explain
"I See Protocol I, art. 45, supra note 184.
,86 See Protocol I, art. 5, para. 2, supra note 184.
- For a similar point of view see Sandoz et. al. supra note 175, at 576; BOTHE,
PARTSCH, & SOLF, supra note 181, at 271-72; Yusuf, supra note 4, at 125; Shearer,
Commentary, 9 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 41, at 44 (1985).
,"I XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/III/369, at 511 (1977).
119 VI Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
4th Sess., Doc. CDDH/Sr.41, para. 81, at 157 (1977).
190 See Id. at 159, para. 92; id. at 160, paras. 97-98; id. at 175-76, 192, 194-95.
"I, Sandoz et. al., supra note 175, at 577.
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the phenomenon. One need only refer to the high salaries which are
paid to mercenaries and to the fact that, despite an international
condemnation of the use of mercenaries, mercenarism is often por-
trayed as a flamboyant and colorful profession. It is portrayed in
fact as a great adventure. 92 There are also a number of people who
want to be involved in armed conflicts and who need to feel that
they are fighting for a just cause. However, as Enloe explains:
Most mercenaries come from groups-Gurkhas, Irish, Hessians,
Meos-that are economically and politically disadvantaged. Being a
mercenary is not so much an indication of an adventurous spirit as
it is a testimony to minimal opportunities available to an individ-
ual. 193
If the practice of mercenarism is to be eliminated, the underlying
reasons for becoming a mercenary must also be addressed. Even the
existence of legal sanctions may not necessarily deter all people from
becoming mercenaries. If the international community is serious about
eliminating the practice of mercenarism it must also deal with a series
of broader issues.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Mercenaries have been the subject of debate within the United
Nations since the early 1960's. Despite this international concern with
the use and financing of mercenaries, they continue to play an im-
portant role in the destabilization process of a number of countries.
One need only refer to the recent mercenary activities in Africa and
more specifically to the use of mercenaries in Angola, South Africa,
the Comoros and Mozambique. 94 Mercenary activities have also oc-
curred in such countries as the Republic of Maldives, Nicaragua and
Colombia. 95 As the Special Rapporteur in his 1988 report noted:
"the problem of mercenaries continues to be as important a factor
as ever in conflicts of various kinds .... Mercenary practices have
9 See Peter, supra note 4, at 377.
193 C.H. Enloe, Mercenarization, in U.S. MiLrTARY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN
AFMCA 109-29 (Western Massachussets Association of Concerned African Scholars
ed. 1978).
,94 For a more complete analysis of the recent problems of mercenaries in Africa,
see The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples Under
Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n.
Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/14 (1990) (Report
of Special Rapporteur).
19- Id. at pp. 22-36.
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increased in volume and proportion ... and have become a more
complex phenomenon by virtue of the manifold forms of organization
and intervention that have developed."' 96
It is essential that the international community grant top priority
to the question of curbing the use of mercenaries because mercenarism
is an affront to the principles of sovereign equality, political inde-
pendence, and territorial integrity of States. Mercenarism has con-
tinued to flourish because there did not exist before 1989 any rules
of positive international law that directly condemned mercenary prac-
tices and that specified both the obligations of States and the pre-
ventive measures needed to be taken against the recruitment, utilization,
financing, and training of mercenaries. 97 Although a number of
resolutions were adopted within the United Nations which condemned
mercenarism and the activities of mercenaries, these resolutions were
not formerly incorporated in any international instrument.' 98 With
the adoption of the 1989 Convention, however, there is no longer
any reason why the practice of mercenarism and the activities of
mercenaries should go unpunished.
The only obstacle in the process of punishment of mercenaries is
the fact that few States have ratified or acceded to the Convention.
It is therefore imperative that efforts now be concentrated on getting
States to ratify the Convention. As the Special Rapporteur states in
his 1991 Report, "[biringing the Convention into force will be a real
and effective step forward in eliminating mercenary activities and will
make it easier for States to classify such activities as a crime under
their internal law."' 99
Along with encouraging States to ratify the Convention, the in-
ternational policy of condemning and rejecting mercenary activities
should continue. As part of a policy of prevention, the organs of
the United Nations must also suggest to member States that they
include in their internal laws provisions which define the recruitment
'19 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess. at 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/14 (1988).
197 Id.
198 Several authors argue that General Assembly resolutions and declarations do
not have any legally binding force. See, e.g., Jenks, The Scope of International
Law, 1954 BIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1; Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative
Competence of the General Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (1970); but see
Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1 (1976), who argues that legal effect can be given to the collective
pronouncements of the General Assembly.
199 U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 45, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1991/14 (1990).
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of mercenaries as an offense.m In light of the recent developments
linking the use of mercenaries with the activities of trafficking in
arms, drugs, and currency, it is necessary that the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights continue to examine the situation and that it strive
to formulate a juridical solution to the problem."'
What is truly needed is a statement emanating from the international
community establishing categorically that mercenarism is a crime
against humanity. The inclusion of mercenarism in the Draft Code
of Crimes Against Humanity is a step in the right direction. If the
international community continues to reiterate in international doc-
uments the idea that mercenary activities must be condemned and
punished both with respect to the mercenary directly involved, and
with respect to those using mercenaries and the entity recruiting and
training mercenaries, then the existence and the use of mercenaries
may be eradicated. The essential element is international co-operation.
For a survey of the domestic laws condemning the use of mercenaries and
creating offenses for their recruitment see The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination
and Its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign
Occupation: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts.,
39th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/13 (1982); U.N. ESCOR,
Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 40th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/16 (1982);
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 41st Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1985/13 (1984); U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 42d Sess., Agenda Item
9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/44 (1985); U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 43d
Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/12 (1986); U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n.
Hum. Rts., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/12/Add.1 (1987);
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 45th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1989/14 (1989); U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n. Hum. Rts., 46th Sess., Agenda Item
10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/14 (1990); U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1991/14 (1990).
1,1 For a discussion of the link between drug traffickers and mercenaries see U.N.
ESCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/1990/11 (1990); U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/14 (1990).
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